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GitHub Actions Workflow Security Linter
Review a workflow before it runs. Check action pins, token permissions, untrusted script expressions and privileged pull request patterns locally, with explanations linked to GitHub documentation and Security Lab research.
Quick answer
A GitHub Actions security linter checks workflow YAML for risky patterns before execution. Paste a workflow to review action pinning, permissions, PR head checkouts, untrusted script expressions and legacy commands locally. Findings explain safer patterns and cite GitHub sources. Repository settings and cross-step dataflow still require a separate review.
Review your YAML
YAML is processed in this tab. It is not uploaded or saved by this tool. Input and results are masked from session replay. Prefer redacted configuration.
Safer configuration pattern
This Bash fragment moves untrusted text into an environment variable and quotes its expansion. Do not eval the variable. Replace the SHA placeholder with an upstream commit you verified; it intentionally is not a usable pin. This linter checks pin syntax, not commit authenticity or dependency lockfiles.
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
review:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@<verified-40-character-commit-SHA>
- env:
TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
shell: bash
run: |
printf '%s\n' "$TITLE"Related tools and guides
Frequently asked questions
What does this workflow linter detect?
It flags mutable action references, missing explicit permissions, write-all, selected untrusted checkout patterns under pull_request_target or workflow_run, direct untrusted context references in run expressions, contextual secret and self-hosted runner risks, and disabled legacy workflow commands. It does not execute a workflow.
Why pin actions to a full commit SHA?
A full commit SHA fixes the referenced action revision, while tags and branches can move. Verify that the commit belongs to the upstream repository and review its code. GitHub also documents dependency lockfiles; this paste-only checker does not inspect them or verify the referenced commit.
Why is pull_request_target with PR head checkout risky?
The trigger uses a privileged context that may access write permissions and secrets. Checking out untrusted PR code can expose that context to an attacker when the code executes. Avoid executing PR code there and separate untrusted testing from privileged operations.
How do I handle issue titles and PR bodies safely?
For a Bash run step, pass untrusted values through env and reference a quoted shell variable, such as "$TITLE". Avoid eval and generated code using that value. The linter detects documented direct context expressions, including issue and PR text, comments, reviews, commit metadata and head refs.
Are secret and self-hosted warnings confirmed vulnerabilities?
They are contextual review prompts. This tool cannot know repository visibility, runner isolation, environment approvals, actual token defaults or whether artifacts are trusted. Review these settings, especially for pull_request_target, workflow_run and public contribution triggers.
Does the tool upload YAML or require an account?
No account is required. Parsing and linting happen in your browser without uploading or saving the YAML. The editor and results are masked from session replay. There is no daily usage quota. Use redacted workflows even though the check is local.
Which YAML and analysis features are unsupported?
Expand anchors, aliases and merge keys before pasting. Multiline flow collections, multiline plain or quoted scalars, tags and complex keys are unsupported. The tool cannot follow reusable workflows, inspect action code, resolve dynamic runner labels or trace data across steps. Use repository code scanning as well.
Sources behind the rules
- GitHub Actions security hardening (opens a new tab)
- GitHub script injection guidance (opens a new tab)
- Security Lab: preventing pwn requests (opens a new tab)
- Security Lab: untrusted input (opens a new tab)
- Workflow token permissions (opens a new tab)
- Workflow command deprecation (opens a new tab)
- GitHub runner insecure-command handling (opens a new tab)
- Default disabling of set-env and add-path (opens a new tab)