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Zero Trust12 min read

Entra ID Break Glass Accounts: Setup, Monitoring & Zero Trust

Set up Entra ID emergency access accounts with FIDO2 or CBA, permanent admin roles, safe CA exclusions, sign-in alerts, and 90-day validation.

I
Microsoft Cloud Solution Architect
Updated

Quick answer

A break glass (emergency access) account is a cloud-only Microsoft Entra ID account used to restore administrative access when normal admin paths are unavailable. Create at least two on your tenant's .onmicrosoft.com domain, with permanent active Global Administrator assignments. Protect them with passkey (FIDO2), Microsoft's recommended method, or certificate-based authentication (CBA) if you already have a PKI. Exclude them from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign-in, and alert on every sign-in. CA exclusions do not exempt them from mandatory MFA.

Entra ID Break Glass Account: Setup, Monitoring & Zero Trust Best Practices infographic showing key Zero Trust concepts and controls
Entra ID Break Glass Account: Setup, Monitoring & Zero Trust Best Practices infographic showing key Zero Trust concepts and controls
Entra IDZero TrustIdentity SecurityMicrosoftConditional AccessAzure AD

Update (October 28, 2026): This guide previously recommended password-only accounts with paper passwords. That advice has been replaced: emergency access accounts must complete MFA for the operations covered by Microsoft's mandatory enforcement. Use FIDO2 or CBA, keep credentials securely available, and test the actual recovery path. Microsoft's current terminology is "emergency access accounts," also adopted in the SC-300 outline effective today. S1S3

The Lockout That Shouldn't Have Happened

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Consider this lockout scenario: an IT team rolls out a Conditional Access policy requiring compliant devices across all users, including admins. Their normal admin devices don't satisfy the policy, and the team loses the access needed to fix it.

The recovery question is simple: do you have an independently protected administrative path that still works? A password-only account is not that path when the service requires MFA. You need a tested emergency access account with authentication that satisfies the requirement.

What a Break Glass Account Actually Is

A break glass (emergency access) account is a highly privileged cloud-only account reserved for restoring administrative access. It is not federated or synchronized, and it is excluded from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign-in. Report-only policies don't block access and don't require an exclusion. S1

The term comes from the old concept of a fire extinguisher behind glass: you break the glass in an emergency. You don't use it for everyday tasks.

The goal is resilience, not removal of authentication. Use strong authentication different from your normal administrators. If they use Authenticator, Microsoft's example is to use a FIDO2 security key for emergency access. That separates the recovery method from the normal method without relying on a password-only exception. S1

How Many Break Glass Accounts Do You Need?

Microsoft recommends two or more emergency access accounts, not exactly two. Start with at least two so one unavailable credential does not leave you without a fallback. S1

For the FIDO2 setup described here, use two FIDO2 keys, one registered to each of the two accounts, stored in separate fireproof safes in separate locations. Document which key belongs to which account and who can retrieve it. Microsoft recommends secure, geographically separate credential storage; this is a practical way to implement it. S1

Creating Break Glass Accounts Correctly

Naming Convention

Choose names your administrators can identify from the recovery runbook. For example, svc-iam-recovery01@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com and svc-iam-recovery02@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com. Treat the names as identifiers, not as a security control.

Document the account UPNs, Object IDs, credential locations, and recovery procedure in an offline runbook available to the people responsible for emergency access.

Account Configuration

Create cloud-only users through the Entra admin center under Entra ID → Users → New user → Create new user, or use Microsoft Graph as shown below. Use your tenant's .onmicrosoft.com domain. Do not synchronize these accounts from on-premises Active Directory or federate them. S1

Use phishing-resistant authentication. Choose passkey (FIDO2), which Microsoft recommends, or CBA if your organization already has a PKI. Both can satisfy the mandatory MFA requirement. A long password does not replace this step. S1

Understand the enforcement boundary. Phase 1 began in October 2024 for CRUD operations in the Azure portal, Entra admin center, and Intune admin center; Microsoft 365 admin center followed in February 2025. Phase 2 began October 1, 2025 for Create, Update, and Delete operations through Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Azure mobile app, IaC tools, and management.azure.com REST APIs. The Phase 2 postponement window ended July 1, 2026. Emergency access accounts are included, and CA exclusions do not bypass enforcement. The cited enforcement applies to public Azure cloud, not US Government or sovereign clouds. S2

The following Graph example creates a cloud-only user. It prompts for a bootstrap password rather than generating and printing a recovery secret. Run it from the designated secure workstation and do not capture the password in transcripts or logs. This is user creation only, not a complete emergency access configuration.

# Install if needed: Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Scope CurrentUser
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.ReadWrite.All"

$bootstrapSecret = Read-Host "Enter the bootstrap password" -AsSecureString
$secretPointer = [IntPtr]::Zero
try {
  $secretPointer = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($bootstrapSecret)
  $passwordProfile = @{
    password = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringBSTR($secretPointer)
    forceChangePasswordNextSignIn = $false
  }

  $user = New-MgUser -DisplayName "SVC IAM Recovery 01" `
    -UserPrincipalName "svc-iam-recovery01@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com" `
    -AccountEnabled `
    -PasswordProfile $passwordProfile `
    -PasswordPolicies "DisablePasswordExpiration" `
    -MailNickname "svc-iam-recovery01"

  $user | Select-Object Id, UserPrincipalName
}
finally {
  if ($null -ne $passwordProfile) { $passwordProfile.Clear() }
  if ($secretPointer -ne [IntPtr]::Zero) {
    [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ZeroFreeBSTR($secretPointer)
  }
  $bootstrapSecret.Dispose()
  Remove-Variable passwordProfile, bootstrapSecret, secretPointer -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}

The Graph request needs a password string in process memory; secure prompting and cleanup do not make it a passwordless provisioning operation. The password is not the recovery method. Repeat user creation with the other account's identifiers and its own bootstrap secret.

Complete the setup before treating either account as ready:

  1. Register the recovery credential. Follow the passkey (FIDO2) registration guidance linked from Microsoft's emergency access account guide. In the account's Security info registration experience, add the passkey/security key method, select the security key path, and complete the browser and hardware-key prompts. Repeat for the other account with its separate key. Use the supported enrollment prerequisites in Microsoft's guidance; creating the user does not register a passkey. If using CBA instead, configure it using Microsoft's linked CBA guidance and your existing PKI. No passkey-registration PowerShell cmdlet is assumed here.
  2. Assign Global Administrator. Assign the role through the Entra admin center. If you use PIM, make the assignment active permanent, not eligible. Emergency access must not depend on activation during the incident. S1
  3. Protect credential availability. Ensure the device or credential does not expire and is outside automated cleanup. Store the two FIDO2 keys in separate fireproof safes at separate locations. Do not tie MFA or SSPR registration to an individual employee's device. S1
  4. Prepare a secure access path. Use a designated secure workstation or Privileged Access Workstation. Configure the CA exclusions below and sign in using the registered FIDO2 or CBA method before storing the credentials. S1

Excluding Break Glass From Restrictive Conditional Access Policies

Create a dedicated group, such as EmergencyAccess, containing the emergency access accounts. Exclude that group from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign-in. Report-only policies do not block access and do not require an exclusion. S1

Review policies requiring particular devices, locations, or authentication conditions against that recovery path. The phishing-resistant method registered for the emergency account protects it; a CA exclusion does not make password-only access acceptable and does not remove Microsoft's mandatory MFA requirement. S1

Document the group and exclusions, review them when CA policies change, and test that the accounts can actually sign in with the current configuration. Testing normal accounts remains useful, but it does not validate emergency access.

Checking Your Coverage With PowerShell

This review helper lists enabled CA policies without an explicit exclusion for the dedicated group or each emergency account. Replace the placeholder Object IDs and verify group membership separately. It is an exclusion review, not proof that the full recovery path works.

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Policy.Read.All"

$emergencyAccessGroupId = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003"
$breakGlassIds = @(
  "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
  "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002"
)

$policies = Get-MgIdentityConditionalAccessPolicy -All
foreach ($policy in $policies) {
  # Report-only and disabled policies do not block access.
  if ($policy.State -ne "enabled") { continue }

  $users = $policy.Conditions.Users
  $groupExcluded = $emergencyAccessGroupId -in @($users.ExcludeGroups)
  $missingDirectExclusions = @($breakGlassIds | Where-Object {
    $_ -notin @($users.ExcludeUsers)
  })

  if (-not $groupExcluded -and $missingDirectExclusions.Count -gt 0) {
    Write-Warning "Review emergency access exclusions: $($policy.DisplayName)"
  }
}

Review the policy's scope and sign-in restrictions before deciding what needs changing. The helper flags missing explicit exclusions even if an account is outside the policy's inclusion scope. Validate the actual sign-in path at least every 90 days and after relevant changes. S1

Monitoring: Alerting When Break Glass Signs In

Any use of a break glass account should trigger an immediate alert to your security team. These accounts are only used during emergencies, so any sign-in is either a genuine incident or someone using the break glass account inappropriately for routine tasks (which is itself a problem worth investigating).

Log Analytics / Azure Monitor Alert

First, make sure sign-in logs are flowing to Log Analytics. If you're already sending Entra ID diagnostic logs to a Log Analytics workspace (which you should be; see the section on auditing in our Microsoft Entra ID PIM guide), you already have the data.

The KQL query to detect break glass sign-ins:

SigninLogs
| where UserPrincipalName in (
    "svc-iam-recovery01@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com",
    "svc-iam-recovery02@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com"
  )
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    UserPrincipalName,
    AppDisplayName,
    IPAddress,
    LocationDetails,
    Status,
    ConditionalAccessStatus,
    AuthenticationRequirement
| order by TimeGenerated desc

To turn this into an alert: in Azure Monitor, create a new Log search alert rule pointing to your Log Analytics workspace. Set the query to the one above. Set Measurement to count of rows, Alert logic to "Greater than 0", and severity to 0 - Critical. Connect an Action Group for email/SMS notification. Choose the evaluation schedule for your monitoring setup and verify delivery during the recovery drill. Microsoft supports filtering by account Object ID (UserId) or UPN. S1

Microsoft Sentinel Alert Rule

If you're running Microsoft Sentinel, add a scheduled analytics rule:

let breakGlassAccounts = dynamic([
  "svc-iam-recovery01@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com",
  "svc-iam-recovery02@yourtenant.onmicrosoft.com"
]);
SigninLogs
| where UserPrincipalName in (breakGlassAccounts)
| where ResultType == "0"  // Successful sign-in only
| extend
    AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]),
    AccountDomain = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| project
    TimeGenerated,
    UserPrincipalName,
    AccountName,
    AccountDomain,
    IPAddress,
    AppDisplayName,
    LocationDetails,
    ConditionalAccessStatus

Set severity to High and map the entities to Account and IP. This will create a Sentinel incident every time a break glass sign-in succeeds, which your SOC can triage.

Also monitor failed sign-in attempts. The first query includes both successful and failed attempts; the Sentinel example filters to successes only. Do not rely on that success-only rule for complete sign-in coverage. Monitor audit activity for these accounts as well, and perform a post-mortem review after every emergency use. S1

Periodic Testing Without Triggering False Alarms

You need to verify that break glass accounts work before you need them in a crisis. Microsoft recommends validating functionality at least every 90 days, and after staff or subscription changes. Also verify the recovery path after relevant CA changes. S1

The challenge is that testing will trigger your monitoring alerts, and that's actually fine. Testing should trigger the alerts. What you need is a process so your team knows the difference between a test and a real incident.

Before each test:

  1. Notify your security team that a break glass test is scheduled (time and who will perform it).
  2. Document the planned test window in your incident management system.
  3. Retrieve the registered FIDO2 key or CBA credential from secure storage and use the designated secure workstation.

During the test:

  • Sign in to the Azure portal with each break glass (emergency access) account using its registered FIDO2 or CBA method.
  • Verify you can access Entra ID and Conditional Access policies.
  • Verify the Global Administrator role is still active permanent, rather than PIM eligible.
  • Check that the credential or device has not expired or entered automated cleanup, and that MFA or SSPR registration is not tied to an individual employee's device. S1
  • Do not use the account for any actual administrative changes.
  • Sign out immediately after verification.

After the test:

  • Confirm the alert fired as expected.
  • Log the test result (success/failure, any issues noted).
  • Return the credentials to secure storage.
  • Update your runbook with the test date.

If the test fails (the account doesn't work, the credentials are wrong, the role was removed), fix it immediately. A break glass account that doesn't work is as dangerous as no break glass account at all.

Common Mistakes

Keeping a password-only recovery path. Mandatory MFA includes emergency access accounts for covered operations. Replace the old paper-password-only design with FIDO2 or CBA, and test it. A CA exclusion does not exempt the account. S1

Storing credentials only digitally. The recovery method should remain retrievable during the incident. Microsoft recommends storing credentials such as FIDO2 keys in secure, fireproof safes in separate locations. In this setup, the two registered keys go in separate safes. Paper instructions can support retrieval, but a paper password is not a replacement for MFA. S1

Missing restrictive CA exclusions. Use the dedicated EmergencyAccess group to exclude the accounts from policies that block or restrict sign-in. Report-only policies need no exclusion. Confirm membership and test the current policy configuration. S1

Using break glass for routine tasks. These accounts exist for emergency recovery. Keep ordinary administration on normal admin accounts so emergency account activity remains meaningful.

Keeping only one account. Microsoft recommends at least two. Keep the credentials independently retrievable rather than depending on one storage location. S1

Leaving the role eligible or the credentials subject to cleanup. Use permanent active Global Administrator assignments in PIM. Ensure credentials and devices do not expire or fall within automated cleanup. S1

Forgetting to test or monitor. Validate at least every 90 days and after staff or subscription changes. Test alert delivery, monitor sign-in and audit activity, and review every emergency use. S1

Break Glass and Zero Trust Are Aligned

Emergency access is a documented, protected recovery path. It does not bypass mandatory MFA. The account uses phishing-resistant authentication, physically protected credentials, explicit exclusions from restrictive CA policies, monitoring, and regular validation. S1

The Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access setup guide covers the policy design around this recovery path. The PIM guide covers privileged role management: use just-in-time access for ordinary administration while keeping emergency Global Administrator assignments active permanent as Microsoft recommends. S1

For the resource governance layer, see Azure Policy vs Defender for Cloud.

Build the recovery accounts. Register the strong authentication method. Monitor them. Test them. The time to discover a broken emergency path is during a drill.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a break glass account in Microsoft Entra ID?

A break glass (emergency access) account is a cloud-only account reserved for restoring administrative access when normal paths fail. Use a .onmicrosoft.com UPN, permanent active Global Administrator assignment, and phishing-resistant authentication. Exclude it from CA policies that block or restrict sign-in, and monitor its sign-in and audit activity. S1

How many break glass accounts should I create?

At least two, not exactly two. Microsoft recommends two or more. In the FIDO2 setup here, register two keys, one for each account, and store them in separate fireproof safes in separate locations. Use a recovery authentication method different from normal administrators. S1

Should break glass accounts have MFA enabled?

Yes. Emergency access accounts must complete MFA for operations covered by Microsoft's mandatory enforcement. Microsoft recommends passkey (FIDO2), or CBA if you already have a PKI. Both satisfy the MFA requirement. Exclusion from a CA policy does not exempt the account from system enforcement, and a long paper password does not compensate for missing MFA. S1

How do I monitor break glass account usage in Microsoft Sentinel?

Create a KQL analytics rule in Microsoft Sentinel that queries SigninLogs for successful or failed sign-ins from your break glass account user principal names. Set the alert severity to High and configure it to fire immediately on any sign-in event. Set up both a Sentinel analytics rule for incident creation and an Azure Monitor alert for email/SMS notification so that multiple alerting channels are active. Any use of a break glass account, including planned tests, should trigger an investigation workflow.

What Conditional Access policies should exclude break glass accounts?

Exclude the dedicated EmergencyAccess group from CA policies that block or restrict sign-in. Report-only policies do not block access and need no exclusion. Review exclusions when policies change and test account functionality at least every 90 days. These exclusions do not remove mandatory MFA. S1

References

RD / 01

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I

Microsoft Cloud Solution Architect

Cloud Solution Architect with deep expertise in Microsoft Azure and a strong background in systems and IT infrastructure. Passionate about cloud technologies, security best practices, and helping organizations modernize their infrastructure.

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